# Neg – PGMs 2 – BFHR

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## PGMs NEG

### 1NC---AT: Turkey

#### Appeasement fails.

Aktar 22 [Cengiz Aktar; professor of political science at the University of Athens; 5-23-2022; "Appease and enable: The West’s disastrous Russia and Turkey policies"; POLITICO; https://www.politico.eu/article/appease-enable-west-disastrous-russi-turkey-policies/; KL]

Despite how odd Turkey’s strategic choices as a NATO member may be, the West continues to do business as usual with Ankara.

Western powers once again make excuses for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, understanding Turkey’s mysterious “legitimate security concerns,” which often equates to a license to kill. But by appeasing him for the sake of “keeping” the country within NATO, they miss the point that the Turkish leader is not so different from Russian President Vladimir Putin — and that once again, a policy of appeasement simply won’t work.

As the war in Ukraine has unfolded, Turkey has been allowed to indulge in its long-running double game, continuing to play Russia and the West against each other, delivering pre-ordered drones to Kyiv on the one hand, while ignoring sanctions against Moscow and opposing Finland and Sweden’s applications to join NATO on the other.

But as pointless offers to broker peace by Turkey’s president have “convinced” the West of Ankara’s “strategic value,” Erdoğan — “the dictator we need,” to quote Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi — is back on the global stage once more. Even United States President Joe Biden’s administration has started lobbying lawmakers to agree to the delivery of fighter jets to Ankara.

Yet the similarities between Russia and Turkey today, as well as the strongmen who have shaped them, draw an obvious and ominous parallel that should be noted by Western leaders.

Topping the list of citizen complaints before the European Court of Human Rights, the systems Erdoğan and Putin have crafted disregard the rule of law and supersede it with one-man rule, as they both have surrounded themselves by oligarchs and yes-men. Both countries are undemocratic, their elections neither free nor fair, their regimes pushing narratives and pursuing actions that are irredentist, revisionist and bellicose.

In both Russia and Turkey, the opposition — or what remains of it — is systematically hounded and repressed, its leaders attacked or jailed, as in the cases of Alexei Navalny and Selahattin Demirtaş. And there still exist large crowds who recklessly support “their” regimes.

In Europe, Germany has played a central role in appeasing these dictators over the years. And while the country’s elite has started some timid soul-searching about its policy toward Russia in the wake of Ukraine’s invasion, it remains wedded to appeasement and engagement with Turkey.

During her time in office, former Chancellor Angela Merkel developed a Faustian pact with Erdoğan, paying 10 visits to Turkey— three in 2016 alone, when the country was politically and morally devastated — setting a record among Western leaders. And as Merkel continued to visit and welcome Erdoğan in Germany, neither his authoritarian drive at home, nor Turkey’s aggressive moves in the Eastern Mediterranean, Iraq, Libya and Syria or its U.N.-documented sponsorship of jihadi terrorism lessened. None of this deterred Merkel’s unconditional support either, including arms sales — just as with Russia.

Since 2015, the EU has followed this appeasement policy initiated and led by Merkel. And Ankara’s pro-EU utterances, its empty rhetoric on reforms and tactical retreats from confrontation are systematically taken for granted by the pro-Ankara axis.

This cynical agenda is driven by the fear of losing “NATO partner Turkey” to Russia. In addition, Europeans have been avoiding jeopardizing their economic interests in Turkey and are fearful of placing their refugee deal with Ankara at risk. They have also been terrified of doing anything that might trigger a social implosion — despite the fact that appeasement is not an adequate answer to any of these of these angsts.

The more the EU and the West appease, the more brazen and entrenched Erdoğan becomes, and the more insolent and dangerous he is for others. Exactly like Putin.

There are strong similarities between Russian arrogance toward Ukrainians and Turkish high-handedness toward the Kurds. Ankara targets anything that sounds or looks Kurdish — inside or outside the country. And both Erdoğan and Putin see it as their historic missions to “civilize” these “substandard” and finally “non-existing” nations, to invoke their right to self-defense and preventive strikes against Nazis and terrorists respectively, who they say threaten to attack “peace-loving” Russia or Turkey.

When it comes to the rules of “war” — a proscribed term in both countries — both armies outdo others’ war crimes against civilians. Putin targets Ukrainian grain warehouses; Erdoğan steals the olive oil of Syrian Kurds; and both have cut water supplies. Forced relocation and ethnic cleansing have been common practice in both countries. In Turkish-occupied northern Syria, the Kurdish language is banned in official institutions and schools and replaced by Turkish, much like in occupied Ukrainian land, where Russian has ousted the Ukrainian and Turkish Tatar languages.

Despite the disastrous consequences of its pre-invasion policy toward Russia, the West continues to indulge their illusions about Turkey. Appeasers fail to understand that Western standards, values and principles are obstacles to the functioning of these regimes.

Thus, they cannot be engaged through values and rules-based approaches but need to be treated as what they are — security threats.

#### Sales have significant implications for the Greek-Turkish security balance.

Zanotti 22 [Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs; Clayton Thomas, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs; 6-7-2022; "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief"; Congressional Research Service; https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44000.pdf; KL]

With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in 2021,104 U.S. willingness to upgrade Turkish F-16s could have significant implications for the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three countries.105 Erdogan announced in May 2022 that he would no longer deal with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, after Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a May 17 joint session of Congress.106 Turkey and Greece have long-standing disputes over maritime and airspace boundaries, energy exploration, and the status of Cyprus (see text box). A recent 2019-2020 spike in tensions has somewhat subsided, but during that time Greece strengthened its relations with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.107

#### Greece says no and despises the plan. Or it escalates. This is their prime minister’s speech.

Mitsotakis 22 [Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece; 6-7-2022; "Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the US Congress"; ekathimerini.com; https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1184653/prime-minister-kyriakos-mitsotakis-address-to-the-joint-session-of-the-us-congress/; KL]

And speaking of open acts of aggression, I ask you, esteemed members of Congress, not to forget an open wound that has caused Hellenism unending pain over the past 48 years. I am referring to the invasion and subsequent division of Cyprus. This issue has to be resolved in accordance with international law and in line with the relevant decisions of the United Nations Security Council. As I told President Biden yesterday, nobody can and nobody will accept a two- state solution in Cyprus.

The same is true for all other regional disputes. Greece is a peace seeking democracy that always extends a hand of friendship to our neighbors. We are always open to dialogue. But there is only one framework we can use to resolve our differences: international law and the unwritten principles of good neighborly relations.

I want to be absolutely clear. We will not accept open acts of aggression that violate our sovereignty and our territorial rights. These include overflights over Greek islands, which must stop immediately.

Please also note: the last thing that NATO needs at a time when our focus is on helping Ukraine defeat Russia’s aggression is another source of instability on NATO’s Southeastern flank. And I ask you take this into account when you make defense procurement decisions concerning the Eastern Mediterranean.

#### Greece war draws in great powers.

Özgür 22 [Ozan Özgür; World Socialist writer; 6-14-2022; "NATO-Russia war inflames conflict between Turkey and Greece"; World Socialist Web Site; https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2022/06/14/xxxd-j14.html; KL]

Amid the ongoing US-NATO war against Russia in Ukraine, tensions are rising dangerously between NATO member states Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea. The two countries are holding war games aimed at each other, trading accusations of disregarding international treaties, and violating each other’s borders with jet fighters and warships.

The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) Ephesus 2022 exercise, held in the Aegean Sea and attended by more than 10,000 military personnel, ended last week. Thirty-seven countries, including the United States and Italy, participated in air, sea and land drills. Held in Seferihisar, only 1.5 kilometers from the nearby Greek island of Samos in the Aegean Sea, the exercise was based on the scenario of a “military landing on an island.” It was widely treated in Turkish capitalist media as a threat against Greece.

Greek media reported that during Greece's naval exercise Storm 2022, which ended on May 27, Turkey sent “two F-16 fighter jets that violated Greek airspace, reaching just two 2.5 nautical miles from the northern port city of Alexandroupoli.”

During the Ephesus 2022 exercise, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accused Greece of militarizing Aegean Sea islands in violation of international agreements. He warned Athens 'one last time' on this: “We invite Greece to stop militarizing the islands that have non-military status and to act in accordance with international agreements. I’m not joking, I’m speaking seriously.”

Threatening to militarize Turkish islands if necessary to threaten Greece, Erdoğan said, “We again warn Greece to avoid dreams, statements and actions that will lead to regret, just as they did a century ago,” a reference to the Turkish war of independence against the British-backed Greek invasion in 1919-1922.

A week ago, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Çavuşoğlu accused Greece of violating its peace treaties with Turkey: “But what is another reason for Greece to be aggressive? Greece's violation of the status of the islands given to it in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and 1947 Paris Treaty under the condition of not militarizing them [Greek islands in the Aegean Sea], and our raising this violation within the framework of international law.”

Cavusoglu added: “The sovereignty of the islands will be questioned if Greece does not end its violation.” This threat to “question” Greece’s sovereignty over islands it controls amount to a threat to invade them and go to war.

The Greek Foreign Ministry reacted to the Ephesus-2022 exercise and statements by Turkish officials on Twitter, writing, “Ankara poses a threat to regional peace and security.” On Thursday, Greek government spokesman Giannis Oikonomou dismissed the Turkish claims, calling them “Ahistorical claims and baseless myths that can neither challenge nor, let alone, substitute for international law and international treaties.”

Accusing Erdoğan of provocation, Oikonomou threatened, “It is clear to everyone that our country has upgraded its geostrategic and geopolitical footprint as well as its deterrent capacity to be able at any time to defend its national sovereignty and sovereign rights.”

A century after World War I began in the Balkans, NATO and the bourgeois governments in the region again risk plunging the world into a catastrophic war. In 2020, tensions between Turkey and Greece over natural gas and sea borders in the eastern Mediterranean were defused by EU and especially German mediation. Greek-Turkish talks resumed. However, as the World Socialist Web Site warned, “History shows such conflicts cannot be peacefully resolved under capitalism, whether or not a temporary Greek-Turkish peace deal is somehow reached.”

The US-NATO war on Russia in Ukraine has now inflamed the Greek-Turkish conflict, turning the Aegean into an undeclared second front in the NATO-Russia war.

The right-wing government of Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has unabashedly aligned itself with Washington’s moves against Russia. The Greek port of Alexandroupoli in the northern Aegean Sea has been transformed into a major US military base. Alexandroupoli is also being used to deliver weapons to Ukraine and to NATO forces along the border with Ukraine in Romania.

The Turkish bourgeoisie has pursued a cynical, two-faced policy on the NATO war on Russia. On the one hand, it has backed NATO’s Ukraine policy, including the far-right coup NATO backed in Kiev in 2014, and armed Kiev with armed Bayraktar TB2 drones. On the other, it has kept diplomatic channels with Russia open, greeting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Ankara, and posed certain obstacles to the most aggressive NATO moves targeting Russia.

Ankara closed the straits linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea coast of Ukraine and Russia to both NATO and Russian warships, blocking a NATO naval attack on Russia. It also threatened to veto NATO’s plans to absorb Sweden and Finland and post NATO troops on Russia’s northern border with Scandinavia. The Turkish government was not objecting to the war, however, but continuing its long-standing targeting of the Kurdish people: it denounced Sweden and Finland for having ties to Kurdish-nationalist organizations.

Washington responded to this veto threat by inviting Mitsotakis to give a speech denouncing Turkey in the US Congress. During his enthusiastically received speech, Mitsotakis blamed Turkey for the division of the Mediterranean island of Cyprus and demanded a halt to US F-16 sales to Turkey. US President Joe Biden also gave Mitsotakis strong support.

Erdoğan condemned Mitsotakis' trip, declaring that Mitsotakis “no longer exists” for him. Erdoğan added that he viewed the US-NATO bases in Greece, targeting Russia and growing Chinese economic influence in the region, as a threat to his government, saying, “And, most importantly, there are nearly a dozen bases in Greece. Whom does Greece threaten with those bases?”

Workers in Greece, Turkey and internationally must be warned: the danger that the conflicts in the Black Sea and the Balkans will escalate uncontrollably into a world war is very great. In the third year of the COVID-19 pandemic, prices are spiraling out of control as the financial aristocracy massively increases its wealth. This has provoked strikes and protests internationally, and capitalist governments are all terrified of the international eruption of the class struggle.

#### Russian-Turkish relations are inevitable.

Kara 22 [Mehtap Kara, PhD in International Relations from Eastern Mediterranean University, assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bahçeşehir Cyprus University; 6-13-2022; "Turkish-American strategic partnership: is Turkey still a faithful ally?"; Southeast European and Black Sea Studies; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683857.2022.2088081?journalCode=fbss20; KL]

Turkish-Russian rapprochement and future of the transatlantic alliance

Turkish-Russian relations deteriorated after Turkey’s shot down of a Russian jet over Turkish territory in November 2015. However, the failed coup attempt marked a new beginning between the two. Both countries have reached agreements on several issues, including the maintaining territorial integrity of Syria despite their differences of opinion about the future of the Assad regime. Along with individual leaders’ common frustration with the Western countries, both countries also have been driven by pragmatism (Ibryamova and Kara 2017). In Turkey and Russia, the decision-making mechanism is centralized around one person. Both leaders, Erdoğan and Putin, have strong leadership characteristics and have been in power for a long time, which evidences that, further to the strategic interest, Turkish-Russian reconciliation is also the result of the overlapping ideologies of both political leaders on several issues, including being sceptical about the Western countries’ intentions, restricting media freedom, oppressing oppositions, and using nationalist narration and religious values in policy making (Nougayrède 2014). Erdoğan’s growing personal domination has turned into an authoritarian populism, especially after the Gezi Park protests and transition from parliamentary to a new presidential system, which allowed him to further consolidate his executive powers (Özpek and Tanriverdi 2018; Castaldo 2018; Özen 2020; Cilliler 2021). The new presidential system enabled Erdoğan to have a monopoly over the country’s foreign policy and national security matters. His populist rhetoric has been characterized by nationalism and anti-Western discourse where the West, particularly the US, is resituated as the ‘other’ (Kaliber and Kaliber 2019). Erdoğan seized disproportionate power to shape the country’s response to external stimuli and the AKP’s unofficial coalition partner, the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli. Both leaders’ images and threat perceptions have been based on an enemy image of Western countries.

Russia successfully took advantage of the increasing tension between Turkey and the Western countries. During a telephone conversation on a special occasion, both leaders, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Erdoğan, used the term ‘strategic partnership’ to define Turkish-Russian bilateral relations (Mercouris 2017), which is quite significant, considering the term was also used to define the Turkish-American relations. Turkish policymakers have tried to respond to uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to shape regional developments in its favour by establishing new alliances with Russia and Iran. One manifestation of this was the result of the Astana peace talks. On 15 September 2017, Russia, Turkey and Iran signed a deal to establish de-escalation zones across Syria, including Syria’s northwest province of Idlib.1 Turkish authorities believed that this was another opportunity to break the terror corridor, which was the term for YPG’s three cantons in Northern Syria established in 2014, located southern border of Turkey. The YPG aimed to unite these cantons with Afrin canton to have geographical unity. With the support of the US the YPG dominated SDF’s capture of Manbij in 2016 was further extended the corridor on the Turkish border (Milliyet 2022). During the Idlib operation, Erdoğan pointed out Afrin as the next stop. ‘Operation Olive Branch’ in Afrin was launched in January 2018 as a response to the US decision to build new border security with the SDF.

As Turkey’s security interest has been long-ignored by its Western allies, Turkish policymakers felt they were left with no option but to cooperate with non-NATO countries, especially after the Obama administration blocked the sale of the Patriot air missile defence system to Turkey. These developments have intensified anti-Americanism in Turkey. Turkish policy makers’ desire to build an air defence structure pushed them to seek other options, resulting in Turkey’s deal with Russia to purchase two Russian S–400 surface-to-air missile batteries to improve Turkey’s defence capabilities against threats from Kurdish and Islamist militants across its borders in Syria and Iraq (BBC News 2017). Turkey’s strategic cooperation with Russia has become leverage to manage its troubled relationship with the US. The Turkish-Russian rapprochement and deepening defence cooperation were mainly the results of the US failure to acknowledge Turkey’s security concerns, its alliance with the YPG, and the refusal to retrieve Gülen (Hale 2019; Kibaroğlu 2019). In response to Turkey’s S-400 purchase on 13 August 2018, the US Congress approved a bill to limit the transfer of the F-35 aircraft to Turkey (The US Senate 2018). Since 2002, Turkey has been a partner of the F-35 program both as a buyer and a production partner, has invested more than $1.4 billion in the program and planned to buy 100 of the fighter jets. Turkey’s S-400 deal was received negatively for two reasons. Firstly, the system is not tolerable to NATO defence systems and would create a weak spot in the defences, and secondly, it could threaten NATO secrets by collecting information on NATO’s next-generation fighter jet, the F-35 (Asli 2019). Kathryn Wheelbarger, an acting assistant secretary of defence, underlined that ‘the S-400 is a Russian system designed to shoot down an aircraft like the F-35’ (Stewart and Pamuk 2019). Therefore, the Western allies agreed that Turkey could not have both S-400 and F-35. Although Erdoğan called the US officials several times to establish a joint working group to resolve technical issues, his calls remained unanswered.

Turkey’s S-400 deal with Russia was also the main reason behind the US’s economic warfare against Turkey. After two-year detention, Turkey released the high-profile prisoner, pastor Andrew Brunson, expecting Turkey’s decision would decrease tension with the US. In this sense, the US’s initial decision to withdraw from Syria in December 2018 was received positively by Ankara. Next month, the US also offered to sell the Patriot missile systems to Turkey with the condition that Turkey should cancel the purchase of the S-400 systems. Turkish officials openly stated that it is a done deal and there is no return, and Erdoğan questioned the Western attitudes and pointed out that Greece has Russian S-300 as a NATO member, as well as Slovakia and Bulgaria, yet complained about the Western position on S-400s of Turkey.2 American withdrawal decision was later revised, and 1000 troops were left in Syria to avoid providing an opportunity for ISIS to recover. In return for Turkey’s insistence on S-400s Turkish pilots’ training (for F-35 jets) at the US have been suspended, their entrance to the US bases has been restricted, and the US aligned with F-35 partners to initiate Turkey’s removal process from the F-35 stealth fighter program (Ali and Stewart 2019). The US Senate introduced a bill that calls for full implementation of sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and as well as to review the NATO Treaty to consider the continued inclusion of Turkey in NATO.3 Despite the US warnings and threats of sanctions by Congress, the first delivery of the parts of S-400s arrived in Turkey in July 2019. The systemic pressure of security threats is the most crucial reason behind the changing Turkish foreign policy behaviour, but only through the mediating effect of unit-level variables. The elites’ threat perception, the strategic culture of increasing nationalism, and the strong state-society relations increased the state’s extraction capacity, helped build domestic support for military operations in Syria, and strengthened the country’s defence capacity by acquiring the S-400 missile system from Russia.

With the surprise American pull-out decision in October 2019, the US abandoned its primary ally, the SDF and the YPG. This enabled Turkey to target the YPG without confronting the US, and the Turkish armed forces launched the long-anticipated third major operation, ‘Operation Peace Spring’, to target the SDF held territories and establish a safe zone, 145 kilometres in length and 30 kilometres in depth, in northern Syria (Hurriyet Daily News 2019a). With this operation, Turkey eliminated the establishment of a terror corridor in North-eastern Syria, pushed the YPG back from the Turkish border, and had an opportunity to resettle Syrian refugees in this zone. After the American withdrawal, Kurdish militias had no choice but to make a deal with Russia and the Syrian government to deploy the Syrian army along the border to repel the Turkish assault (BBC News 2019a). This development has ended Syrian Kurds’ ambition to have an autonomous region and self-rule in Syria. In Sochi, Erdoğan and Putin signed the 10-point memorandum plan to end the Turkish offensive. Both countries agreed that Turkish forces would be allowed to remain in the 120 km-long strip of territory (Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad) as a buffer zone against the YPG, Russian and Syrian troops control the remaining border area, the retreat of the YPG from Turkey’s border, and establishing Turkish and Russian joint patrols to implement agreed security mechanism along with Turkish-Syrian border (Aljazeera 2019). Turkey, Russia, and the Syrian regime simultaneously benefited from Turkey’s military operation and the Sochi agreement. Turkey achieved to establish a safe zone to dismantle the YPG structure on its border and forced the US to abandon Kurdish-led forces, Russia remained the most pivotal player in Syria to determine the endgame in the Syrian conflict, and the Assad regime regained control of the Kurdish controlled areas in northeastern Syria.

By agreeing with the YPG, the Russian and Syrian regimes seized an opportunity to implement the 1998 Adana Agreement on border security between Turkey and Syria to re-establish the status quo. Therefore, Turkey eventually will have no option but return to the Adana Accord.4 There are possible risks and adverse outcomes for Turkey’s military operations in Syria. Cook (2018) believes that with these operations, Turkey could find itself in an irregular war in a foreign country with Kurdish militias, who gained combat experience during their alliance with the US. Based on Turkey’s history of forty years of war with PKK, it is likely that Turkey will be withdrawn to long term struggle against guerrilla-like forces in Syria. Through military involvement, Turkey has already signed up to govern the region, including managing various issues ranging from security and education to health and delivering water, which might be a problem to manage in the long run (Daragahi 2018).

Sterling and Folker (2002, 103) underline that states simultaneously might see each other as valuable economic partners and security threats. Therefore, ‘cooperation and competition cannot be separated’ (Doran 2010, 41). Turkey and Russia managed to separate economic cooperation from geopolitical rivalries. This new flexible strategic alliance has led to increased cooperation in various sectors while competing or pursuing different interests in several regions/conflicts. According to Faber, states’ actions work compensatively, and ‘a conflictual action in one policy area is followed by cooperative action vis-à-vis the same government in the same or another policy area’ (1990, 309). The nature of the current Turkish-Russian relationship has been characterized as competitive cooperation. The two countries prefer different outcomes and support opposing sides in the Syrian civil war while also having divergent interests in other regions, including the Balkans, Caucasus, MENA, and Central Asia. Yet, they were able to avoid direct confrontation and accommodated each other’s interests and expanded their sphere of influence in these regions. However, Turkey remains on thin ice in terms of regional competition with Russia, where things can escalate quickly and unexpectedly in any of those regions. For instance, in February 2020, dozens of Turkish soldiers were killed by the Russian backed air strikes in Idlib. After the American withdrawal, Russia controls the outcome of the Syrian conflict. So despite the risks, Turkey continues to strengthen its economic and defence ties with Russia. There is also a growing personal close relationship between Erdoğan and Putin as Erdoğan is growing more authoritarian. This is an opportunity for Russia to include a NATO member in the anti-Western camp as much as possible.

Turkish-Russian cooperation in Syria (facilitating Turkish incursions in Syria) has expanded cooperation in other fields, including economy, tourism, defence, and energy sectors. Besides the purchase of S-400s, a Russian company is building Turkey’s first nuclear plant (Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant) and two pipelines were constructed, the Blue Stream and TurkStream, across the Black Sea to supply natural gas to Turkey. While Turkey is decreasing its reliance on the Western alliance due to its distrust against the West relatively increasing its dependence on Russia in terms of natural gas, trade, and technical expertise in areas from defence to energy. Öniş and Yılmaz (2016) identify Turkish-Russian relations and cooperation in Syria as asymmetric interdependence in a turbulent region. Turkey desires to keep its ties with Russia as leverage against the US. The AKP-MHP alliance plays a vital role in Turkey’s military activism and willingness to pursue more independent policies as well as to take initiatives in the country’s security and national interest in the region. According to Military expenditures data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Turkey’s budget for military expenditure rose 65% between 2009 to 2018, reaching $19.0 billion and putting Turkey among the world’s top 15 military spenders (Tian et al. 2019). Turkey’s security-driven policies are not likely to change as long as the AKP needs MHP’s support in the parliament (after failing to gain half of the seats in the parliament in the June 2018 general election, the AKP became dependent on MHP’s support).

### 1NC---AT: Turkey---Mediation Turn

#### Turkey mediates peace. However, by influencing Turkey and bolstering Ukraine, Russia says no. Nuclear war.

Çuhadar 22 [Esra Çuhadar, Ph.D., senior expert for dialogue and peace processes at the U.S. Institute of Peace; Juan Diaz-Prinz, Ph.D., Acting Director, Inclusive Peace Processes and Reconciliation; 4-28-2022; "To Sustain Hopes for Peace in Ukraine, Keep an Eye on Turkey"; U.S. Institute of Peace; https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/sustain-hopes-peace-ukraine-keep-eye-turkey; KL]

Russia’s atrocities against Ukrainian civilians and its escalated warfare in southeastern Ukraine have swept aside last month’s public discussion of peace options as the countries briefly held talks in Turkey. Yet even in the darkest moments, all sides in this war, including the United States and Europe, have strong interests in maintaining channels for negotiation that can be used when opportunity re-emerges. Protecting that interest means understanding and maintaining Turkey’s role in facilitating talks—and its potential to serve more actively as a mediator.

By at least some norms of peace processes, Turkey is an atypical mediator—but policymakers would do well to note strengths, not widely recognized, that it can bring to this role. While analysts have suggested China, Israel, India and others as possible mediators—and while no options should be ignored—Turkey has emerged as the most immediately useful go-between. It is no accident that Turkey was Kyiv’s and Moscow’s preferred choice for their brief attempts at negotiations in March. By design, Turkey’s role in those talks was limited to facilitation, providing a secure space and even-handed treatment of Russian and Ukrainian negotiators, but without injecting Turkish observations or proposals.

Particularly for Russia, Turkey can seem like an illogical choice as mediator. It is not neutral between the combatants, but rather is a member of NATO, which Russia’s government has declared an enemy. Turkey has supported Ukraine with humanitarian gestures, evacuating some 16,000 civilians from combat zones and receiving nearly 60,000 Ukrainian refugees so far. It has even sold Turkish-built, armed, aerial drones that Ukrainians have deployed against Russian ground offensives. Also, Russia and Turkey have had their own conflicts, both historically and in recent years.

Yet part of Turkey’s utility as an interlocutor for Russia may be some of these very qualities. Any eventual Russian-Ukrainian agreement will need acceptance—and likely, reconstruction funds—from the United States and Europe. As a NATO member, Turkey can offer influence with its U.S. and European allies in securing that support. Turkey has built credibility by developing a specific capacity for mediation over recent decades, and by showing itself to Russia and Ukraine as an independent actor that, while a NATO member, is not unduly influenced by the United States or Europe. Even now, with heightened battlefield violence and accusatory rhetoric from both sides, Turkey is continuing its go-between role. Its diplomats are continuing meetings with both sides separately and keeping lines of communication open. This creates an asset for managing, and hopefully limiting, the conflict—one that policymakers should not ignore.

Why Turkey Seeks the Middle

Turkey is eager to play a mediating role in hopes of shortening a war that threatens its vital strategic and economic interests. If Russia succeeds in its offensive to seize the southern Ukraine coastline, it will come close to restoring the dominance over the Black Sea region that the Soviet Union wielded during the Cold War. Such a resurgence in the power of Turkey’s main historical competitor in the Black Sea is a deeply discomfiting prospect for Turkey’s government.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government also is eager to prevent this war from vastly multiplying Turkey’s existing economic crisis, already the worst in 20 years, in anticipation of presidential and parliamentary elections in 2023. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party consolidated its rule beginning in 2002 by leading Turkey out of its previous recession, but the COVID pandemic and a stall in essential reforms have let inflation and debt surge, and Turks’ living standards decline.

A major economic burden for three decades has been Turkey’s costs from nearby wars—in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Iraq and Syria. These costs include disrupted trade and the flight to Turkey of an estimated 4 million refugees. The new war to Turkey’s north will slash the foreign tourism, more than a quarter of it from Russia and Ukraine, that brings vital revenues. It could put at risk critical energy supplies, for Turkey imports nearly half of its natural gas from Russia (and now depends on gas more heavily with droughts that have cut hydropower production). Also, Russia is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant at Akkuyu, on Turkey’s southern coast.

Turkey’s Credibility as an Interlocutor

Turkey has consciously built a role for itself as a mediator in conflicts over the past two decades and has been careful to sustain dialogue with Russia despite the two countries’ often combative relations. Turkey’s former ambassador to NATO, Tacan Ildem, describes a "competitive cooperation" in which Turkey and Russia work, issue by issue, on a transactional basis. This relationship has let the countries manage their competing roles in conflicts from the South Caucasus region to Libya and Syria. They modulated crises that arose in 2016, after Turkish forces shot down a Russian jet over Syria and the Russian ambassador in Ankara was assassinated.

The countries’ relations improved significantly in the past six years, notably with Turkey's purchase of Russian S-400 air defense missiles at the expense of strains in its alliance with the United States and NATO. Presidents Erdogan and Vladimir Putin have built a rapport, especially following Putin’s support for Erdogan in the wake of the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. The Turkish-Russian successes in practicing “controlled tension” are part of the reason that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy sought Turkey's help with Russia even before Moscow’s re-launch of its war in February.

Ever since Russia’s first attack on Ukraine in 2014—its seizure of Crimea and its thinly veiled assault in the southern Donbas region—Turkey has played both public and secret roles as a go-between. Since that year, it has been Turkish diplomats who headed the main international diplomatic mission in the conflict—that of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In that role, two successive Turkish ambassadors led the arduous daily work of reducing conflicts and facilitating communication between Ukraine’s government and the Russian-backed separatist forces in southernmost Donbas. Turkish officials also have assisted other exchanges between Russia and Ukraine during the eight long years of the war, keeping that role extremely discreet to avoid having it be seen as competing with the OSCE-backed Minsk peace process.

In its Russia-Ukraine efforts, Turkey is building on a foundation that it consciously laid over the past two decades. Turkey became what one senior Turkish diplomat has called a “policy entrepreneur,” advocating greater global use of mediation as a conflict resolution method, notably by the United Nations and OSCE. Within its own region, Turkey has mediated since 2000 between Israel and Palestinians, Israel and Syria, fighting factions in Lebanon and in Iraq, and between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Turkey also facilitated talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between Somalia and the breakaway region of Somaliland. While this priority on mediation has receded with changes to Turkish foreign policy since 2016, Turkey’s experience over the past two decades has become useful for its Ukraine-Russia role.

Sustaining Turkey’s Potential for Peacemaking

The United States and Europe can help Turkey sustain its usefulness as a mediator as the Turkish government confronts three specific challenges. One is how to handle the unprecedented global campaign of economic sanctions against Russia. Turkey traditionally has adhered only to sanctions regimes approved by the United Nations, declining to apply sanctions imposed by individual states or coalitions. Turkey has imposed two specific sanctions of its own, focused on Russia’s military. In February, the Turkish government invoked the 1936 Montreux Convention to close the Bosporus Straits to military ships during wartime, preventing Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea fleet. Last week it announced a three-month closure of its airspace to Russian warplanes or troop transports flying to Syria.

If policymakers are inclined to press Turkey to tighten its adherence to sanctions, they should consider whether such a step might be low in value but high in cost. Turkey’s exports to Russia are largely fruit, fabrics and light industrial goods, rather than strategic products or materials. Yet forcing Turkey to impose fuller sanctions could close the world’s clearest communication channel for an eventual negotiated solution.

Sustaining a Turkish channel for peacemaking also means remaining open to the options for settlement—a preference that Ukraine has signaled, even amid the recent discoveries of Russian atrocities. Many observers have noted the risks of any policy notion that would aim to weaken Russia by letting it bleed in a long conflict—a huge multiplication of the costs to Ukraine and the risks of escalation, including nuclear warfare. A further cost would be the ability of Turkey, or any mediator, to help limit such an unpredictable, longer or wider war.

### 1NC---AT: Turkey---Transactionalism Bad

#### Transactionalism exacerbates future disputes.

Coşkun 22 [Alper Coşkun; senior fellow within the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, especially in relation to the United States and Europe; 5-12-2022; "Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful"; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/12/making-new-u.s.-turkey-strategic-mechanism-meaningful-pub-87117; KL]

Second, while it is wise to spare the Strategic Mechanism of the burden of pointedly focusing on bilateral disagreements, assuming these matters can simply be set aside would be a mistake. The poisonous seeping effects of the problems weighing down the relationship do not afford the luxury of time. That is the underlying risk associated with seemingly practical solutions like embracing transactionalism, attempting compartmentalization, and focusing on low-hanging fruit while leaving problems on the back burner. Such an attempt would mean sleepwalking toward a future in which current problems will probably become more ossified and solutions will be harder to find. Despite such risks, Washington seems more inclined to wait things out, mostly because of its reluctance to engage in a process that is limited to rehashing arguments that have already been made to no effect. Turkey, on the other hand, seems ready to continue the debate, no matter what. The gap that needs to be bridged here involves identifying new common ground to move on. That is the incentive both sides need, and in Washington’s case, it is seen as a prerequisite. But the onus to create these conditions cannot fall on one side alone. It must be a mutual endeavor.

### 1NC---AT: Taiwan

#### No Taiwan invasion. It’s all talk and no action.

Wong 22 [Tessa Wong, BBC reporter citing William Choong, senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and Collin Koh, research fellow with the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies; 6-14-2022; "Taiwan: Are the US and China heading to war over the island?"; BBC News; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61782370; KL]

One major fear is that war would be triggered if China invades Taiwan. Beijing has said in the past it could reclaim the island by force if necessary.

But most analysts say this is not likely - for now.

There has been debate over whether China has the military capability to succeed in an invasion, and Taiwan has been considerably ramping up its air and sea defences.

But many agree that Beijing recognises that such a move would be too costly and disastrous - not only for China, but also for the world.

"There's a lot of rhetoric, but the Chinese have to mind the gap very carefully if they want to launch an invasion of Taiwan, especially so close to the Ukraine crisis. The Chinese economy is far more interconnected with the global economy than Russia's is," says William Choong, senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

What does China want from the Ukraine crisis?

China's consistent position has been that it seeks "peaceful reunification" with Taiwan - something that Gen Wei reiterated on Sunday - and that it would only act if faced with a provocation.

One trigger would likely be Taiwan formally declaring independence. But this is something that its President Tsai Ing-wen has strenuously avoided, even as she insists they are already a sovereign state.

Most Taiwanese support this position, which is known as "maintaining the status quo", though increasingly a small number say they want to move toward independence.

Similarly, the US would be reluctant to be drawn into a costly military conflict in Asia, and has signalled repeatedly that they do not want war.

US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin, who also attended the Dialogue, said in his speech that the US does not support Taiwan independence, nor does it want "a new Cold War".

"Both sides are sticking to their guns on Taiwan. They need to look tough, they don't want to be seen as rolling back or stepping back," said Collin Koh, research fellow with the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

"But at the same time they are very mindful about entering an outright conflict. They're looking at each other's rhetoric with eyes wide open, and both sides are trying to temper the risk."

The fact that both Gen Wei and Mr Austin met at the sidelines of the Shangri-la Dialogue was a positive sign, as it meant that both sides wanted to show "they are still willing to sit down and talk it out, come to a consensus, and agree to disagree," said Mr Koh.

This, he said, would likely lead to more operational discussions between the two militaries that would reduce the possibility of on-the-ground miscalculations that could lead to a conflict, and an overall "reinvigoration of dialogue" that was missing during Donald Trump's administration.

#### China’s playing the long game.

Nathan 22 [Andrew J. Nathan; Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University; 6-23-2022; "Beijing Is Still Playing the Long Game on Taiwan"; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-23/beijing-still-playing-long-game-taiwan; KL]

Concern is growing in Taiwan, in the United States, and among U.S. allies in Asia that China is preparing to attack Taiwan in the near future. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee last year, Admiral Philip Davidson, then the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, warned that Beijing might attempt to seize the island in the next six years. Unifying Taiwan with mainland China is a key element of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream.” And as the political scientist Oriana Skylar Mastro has argued in these pages, Xi wants “unification with Taiwan to be part of his personal legacy,” suggesting that an armed invasion could come before the end of his third term as secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party in 2027 and almost certainly before the end of his probable fourth term in 2032.

Putin’s war in Ukraine has intensified these concerns. Xi’s announcement just before the Russian invasion of a “no limits” partnership with Moscow, coupled with his failure to condemn Putin’s actions and the Chinese media’s endorsement of Russian propaganda, seem to signal Beijing’s support for Russia’s territorial aggression. Beijing may see a strategic opening now that U.S. political and military resources are tied up in Europe. Moreover, Chinese leaders may have interpreted the West’s response to the Russian attack as an indication that the United States will not intervene militarily to defend a country to which it is not bound by a defense treaty, especially against a nuclear-armed adversary. As David Sacks of the Council on Foreign Relations has argued, “Chinese policymakers may conclude that Russia’s nuclear arsenal effectively deterred the United States, which would be unwilling to go to war with a nuclear power over Taiwan.”

But fears of an imminent Chinese attack are misplaced. For decades, China’s policy toward Taiwan has been characterized by strategic patience, as has its approach to other territorial claims and disputes—from India to the South China Sea. Far from spurring China to jettison this approach in favor of an imminent military assault on Taiwan, the war in Ukraine will reinforce Beijing’s commitment to playing the long game. The price Moscow has paid, both militarily and in the form of international isolation, is but a fraction of what China could expect if it were to attempt to take Taiwan by force. Better to wait patiently for Taiwan’s eventual surrender, as Beijing sees it, than to strike now and risk winning the island at too high a cost—or losing it forever.

IMPENDING ATTACK?

Fear that China will attack Taiwan had been growing well before Putin invaded Ukraine. As Robert Blackwill and Philip Zelikow observed in a 2021 report published by the Council on Foreign Relations, Taiwan is “becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that would involve the United States of America, China, and probably other major powers.” In addition to its historical and economic motives for controlling Taiwan, Beijing feels the need to prevent other powers from using the island as a base to pressure China militarily or subvert it politically. For its part, the United States has strong motives for insisting on what Washington has referred to since 1972 as the “peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue”—which, given the anti-unification sentiments of the Taiwanese people, means an open-ended and perhaps permanent state of de facto autonomy for the island. Although there is much emotion on both sides—for China, nationalism; for the United States, commitment to democracy—what makes the Taiwan issue truly nonnegotiable are the two countries’ security interests.

In 1979, when the United States broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan to normalize relations with China, Beijing had a reasonable chance of winning over Taiwan without using force. Taiwan was diplomatically isolated, militarily weak, and increasingly economically dependent on the mainland. China encouraged this dependence by establishing a host of incentives for Taiwanese enterprises to do business on the mainland, by purchasing Taiwanese exports, and by sending Chinese tourists to the island. Beijing also invested in Taiwanese media with the aim of generating favorable news coverage and held exchanges with leaders of the anti-independence Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party.

But these efforts proved insufficient to stem the tide against unification in Taiwanese public opinion and politics. According to opinion polls, the share of Taiwanese voters favoring unification fell from 28 percent in 1999 to less than two percent in 2022. An overwhelming majority favor “maintaining the status quo,” which in the language of Taiwanese politics means sustaining autonomy without formally declaring independence. Since 2016, the anti-unification Democratic Progressive Party has controlled both the presidency and the legislature, and it looks well positioned to win the next set of national elections in 2024.

Fears of an imminent Chinese attack are misplaced.

These trends have prompted China to adopt a more threatening posture toward Taiwan. Beijing has stepped up measures to isolate the island diplomatically, slowed imports and the tourist trade, trained the Chinese military to conduct the complicated joint operations necessary for a cross-strait invasion, and conducted frequent probes of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. China has also developed what the Pentagon calls “anti-access/area denial” capabilities—including long-range precision missiles, submarine-launched torpedoes, antiship ballistic missiles, cybertools, and space capabilities—designed to hold at bay a U.S. defense of Taiwan.

These moves have fed speculation that China is building up to a full-scale attack. In addition to Xi’s desire to secure his legacy, the shifting balance of power between China and the United States is often cited by U.S. analysts as a possible motivation for Xi. The scholars Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, for instance, have suggested that China may attack in the near term because it has reached the peak of its national strength—and China’s leaders know it. China is looking at a period of decline caused by a combination of unsustainable debt, rising labor costs, an aging population, declining productivity, and a critical water shortage. Meanwhile, the United States and Taiwan have recently started to readjust their military postures to counter the asymmetric threat China poses. The Biden administration is pulling Japan and South Korea together around a commitment to “stability in the Taiwan Strait,” and Western businesses are gradually moving their production sites out of China because of rising labor costs, lack of a level playing field in the Chinese market, and COVID-19 restrictions. As this reorientation gathers steam, the West’s economic incentives to avoid war with China will diminish. By this logic, Beijing has reason to strike before its adversaries are ready.

WAITING GAME

The facts on which such forecasts are based are not wrong, but they are incomplete. A fuller set of facts suggests that China is still pursuing a strategy of strategic patience when it comes to Taiwan. First, Chinese leaders—rightly or wrongly—seem confident that they can handle their own problems better than the West can handle its problems. They don’t deny the challenges that Beckley and Brands highlight, but they believe the West is in decline, hobbled by ill-managed and slow-growing economies, social divisions, and weak political leaders. However, Chinese strategists do not seem to believe that China has yet reached a favorable power balance with the West. As Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, has argued, “China’s global reach still has its limits. Despite being a major power, China also thinks of itself as a developing country—and rightly so, considering that its GDP per capita remains far behind those of advanced economies.”

Beijing can afford to wait for power in the Western Pacific to tip decisively in its favor. When Washington comes to understand that the cost of defending Taiwan is beyond its means, and Taiwanese officials realize that Washington no longer has the appetite for a clash with China, Taiwan will pragmatically negotiate an arrangement that Beijing can accept. In the meantime, China needs only to deter Taipei and Washington from attempting to lock in formal Taiwanese independence. Beijing’s shows of force are not precursors of an imminent attack, therefore, but measures intended to buy time for history to take its course.

Second, contrary to the common portrayal of China as itching for war, Beijing has demonstrated strategic patience in pursuit of its other goals. A good example is Beijing’s behavior in the South China Sea, where China has built and militarized seven sand islands without triggering a war with the United States or rival territorial claimants. It did so by building only on landforms it already controlled, claiming all along that it wasn’t doing what it was doing. The rival territorial claimants were too weak to confront China, while the United States lacked a justification for doing so because it has no territorial claims where China was building. Beijing restricted access to but refrained from seizing a landform it contests with the sole U.S. treaty ally involved in these disputes—the Philippines—which in any case lacked an appetite to invoke its alliance with Washington by moving militarily to defend itself.

The conflict in Ukraine is reminding Xi that war is unpredictable and rule over a resisting population is costly.

China likewise changed the strategic status quo without triggering an armed conflict over the contested Senkaku Islands, known in China as the Diaoyu Islands, by escalating from an occasional maritime presence in Japanese waters to a permanent one, supplementing its naval forces with less confrontational coast guard, maritime militia, and fishing vessels. Beijing followed a similar playbook in the contested Ladakh region of India, where Chinese troops gradually advanced their positions and established a series of new lines of control with only one confirmed outbreak of shooting that was quickly contained.

China has invested in ostensibly civilian port projects across the Indian Ocean and beyond that could serve as foundations for future naval operations, raising some alarm but no counteraction. Beijing has also used its economic and diplomatic influence in Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Oceania and its norm-setting power in international institutions to incentivize governments to align with China’s interests, again generating some alarm but no effective resistance. Such diplomatic, economic, and military “gray zone tactics” illustrate that China’s strategic behavior is geared toward the long term rather than the short term, moving from no presence to sustained presence in a host of arenas without generating substantial pushback, much less armed conflict (with the exception of the fighting in Ladakh). That same strategic caution has so far been evident in China’s policy toward Taiwan, where Beijing has dialed up tension and deterred a Taiwanese drive for independence without precipitating a crisis.

Finally, the lesson Xi is likely drawing from Putin’s war in Ukraine is not that territorial aggression would go unpunished militarily by the West but that it would be both difficult and costly. There is no reason to believe that Xi is surrounded, as Putin seems to be, by yes men who will tell him that a war over Taiwan can be easily won. Even if he is, however, the grinding conflict in Ukraine is reminding him that war is unpredictable and rule over a resisting population is costly. The amphibious operation China would need to undertake to seize Taiwan would be far more difficult than the land invasion Russia has carried out in Ukraine. Xi has been reforming the Chinese military’s command structure and ramping up training for such an operation, but Chinese forces remain untested in actual combat operations. Meanwhile, the chances that the United States would intervene to defend Taiwan have increased as anti-Chinese sentiment has risen in the United States and Europe—and after U.S. President Joe Biden remarked last month that defending Taiwan is “the commitment we made.”

Even if Beijing could win a war over Taiwan, it is unclear that it could win what would come next. As painful as Russia’s isolation from Western economies has been for Moscow, the postwar scenario for the Chinese economy would be even more damaging. China imports 70 percent of its oil and 31 percent of its natural gas; it is the world’s largest coal producer but still needs to import more. Although it is striving for food self-sufficiency, China is the world’s largest importer of food, especially corn, meat, seafood, and soybeans. Some of these energy and food imports come from Russia, but many come from countries that would sanction China if it invaded Taiwan. And even if they did not, China’s navy doesn’t have the global reach to defend the shipping routes across which these and many other vital commodities flow. Any war over Taiwan, even a successful one for Beijing, would deal a devastating blow to the Chinese economy, creating conditions that would threaten domestic political stability and usher in the failure, not the realization, of the Chinese dream.

### 1NC---AT: Taiwan

#### The United States federal government should:

#### substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states in the area of precision-guided munitions equipped with artificial intelligence

#### end arm sales to Taiwan.

#### That solves Taiwan invasion.

Klare et al. 21 [A. Trevor Thrall, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and an associate professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University; Jordan B. Cohen, a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University; Michael Klare, professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and is a senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association; 8-20-2021; "New arms sales send the wrong signal on Taiwan"; Defense News; https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/08/17/new-arms-sales-send-the-wrong-signal-on-taiwan/; KL]

The Biden administration recently approved its first arms sale to Taiwan for $750 million worth of howitzers and high-tech munitions kits. Proponents incorrectly argue that this sale will enhance stability in the region by sending a strong signal to China of America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security and by complicating any Chinese plans for an invasion of the island. In fact, the sale will accomplish nothing of the sort. To avoid enflaming tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. needs to halt sales of weapons to Taiwan.

This sale will not allow Taiwan to better defend itself in any clash with China. It will, however, tell Taiwan that it’s OK to keep passing the buck to the United States for its defense. Moreover, a new sale of arms at this time is sure to inflame tensions between Beijing and Washington, increasing the risk of conflict and making it more difficult to make progress on issues of mutual concern, such as climate change, trade and nuclear nonproliferation.

No matter how many tanks, planes, missiles or howitzers Taiwan buys from the United States, few experts seriously believe that Taiwan is capable of defending itself on its own. Though a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be costly, absent a war between China and the U.S., Taiwan would surely succumb.

Beyond its obvious manpower advantages, China also enjoys overwhelming air and naval superiority that U.S. arms sales alone cannot reverse. China can blockade the island nation, airlift full-scale battle tanks onto the island and overpower Taiwan’s air defense systems. A few more guns, missiles and planes cannot change this.

Despite inaccurate claims that weapons are helping Taiwan become capable of defending itself, decades of American arms sales and reassurances have convinced Taiwanese leaders that the United States is ultimately responsible for Taiwan’s security. Taiwan’s defense spending has remained stuck at about 2 percent of its gross domestic product for years, a great deal of which it has spent on high-tech American weapons that will be of little value in case of a war.

According to a report published by George Mason University for which the authors interviewed Taiwanese military officials, senior lawmakers, elected leaders, former government officials and defense scholars, the U.S. arms sales let “China know America would intervene on our behalf in a conflict.”

In short, when it buys American weapons, Taiwan is simply making insurance payments to guarantee American intervention in response to a Chinese invasion.

But while arms sales may have reassured Taiwan of ultimate U.S. reassurance, they have also angered and alienated Beijing. After the United States recognized mainland China in 1979, it pledged to refrain from selling the Taiwanese offensive weaponry. But advanced fighter jets, missiles and planes are hardly purely defensive. Ironically, President Joe Biden used to understand this. In 1999, then-Sen. Biden stated that mandating arms sales to Taiwan would “be the equivalent of waving a red cape in front of Beijing.”

China’s concern over these increasingly sophisticated weapons sales is understandable. From President Barack Obama’s 2011 “pivot to Asia” to President Donald Trump’s trade war, American concerns over a rising China have clearly been growing. In addition to selling Taiwan increasingly sophisticated weaponry, the Pentagon is deploying additional ships and planes in the areas surrounding China. Not surprisingly, Chinese leaders worry that the U.S. and its allies are reviving the Cold War strategy of encircling their adversaries.

Attempts to deter China with an enhanced U.S. military presence and arms sales to Taiwan are having the opposite effect. China’s defense budget has doubled in the 10 years since Obama announced the pivot. China is also matching increased U.S. air and naval deployments with more aggressive maneuvers of its own. Over the summer, China flew record numbers of warplanes through Taiwan-controlled airspace. And in response to this latest sale, China once again declared it would take countermeasures.

Greater American military involvement and arms sales in the region raises the risk of a conflict breaking out over Taiwan that drags the United States into a war with China — a war that would surely result in widespread death and destruction on all sides. Taiwan is in an unenviable position, but defending Taiwan at the risk of war with China is a bad gamble for both Taipei and Washington to take, especially as Taiwan would almost certainly be reduced to cinders in the process.

Provoking China via arms sales also narrows the already constricted space in which the world’s most powerful nations can make progress on international trade, climate change and other global concerns. Both U.S. and Taiwanese security would be best served in a world where the U.S. and China avoided provocative military actions and sought openings for cooperation on issues of mutual benefit.

#### Invasion is likely now because of aggressive American actions.

Wong 22 [Tessa Wong, BBC reporter citing William Choong, senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and Collin Koh, research fellow with the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies; 6-14-2022; "Taiwan: Are the US and China heading to war over the island?"; BBC News; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61782370; KL]

Weeks after the US president warned China over Taiwan, Beijing has delivered its sternest rebuttal yet, saying it would "resolutely crush any attempt" at Taiwan's independence.

On Sunday, China's Defence Minister General Wei Fenghe essentially accused the US of supporting the island's independence, saying it was "violating its promise on Taiwan" and "interfering" in China's affairs.

"Let me make this clear: if anyone dares to secede Taiwan from China, we will not hesitate to fight. We will fight at all costs and we will fight to the very end. This is the only choice for China," he said at the Shangri-la Dialogue, an Asian security summit held in Singapore.

His comments follow US President Joe Biden's recent message to China that it was "flirting with danger" by flying its warplanes close to Taiwan. He vowed to protect the island militarily if it was attacked.

Taiwan, which considers itself a sovereign nation, has long been claimed by China. But Taiwan also counts the US as its biggest ally, and Washington has a law which requires it to help the island defend itself.

The escalation in rhetoric comes as China increasingly sends warplanes into Taiwan's air defence zone - flying their largest sortie of the year just last month - while the US has sent naval ships through Taiwan's waters.

### 1NC---A2: NATO Unity

#### Squo solves NATO cohesion and unity.

Fouriezos 6-29 [Nick Fouriezos, Journalist at the Atlantic Council. 6-29-2022, "Blinken: NATO is 'more united, more focused' after historic summit", Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/blinken-nato-is-more-united-more-focused-after-historic-summit/, DOA: 7-2-2022 //ArchanSen]

“NATO is emerging from this summit more united, more focused, and with more assets to deal with a multiplicity of challenges,” Blinken said, praising the solidarity shown in this week’s gathering in Madrid.

The conversations at the two-day NATO Public Forum, taking place on the sidelines of the Madrid summit, brought together a number of global leaders in person and virtually, including US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who reaffirmed US support for Article 5, the principle of collective defense, as “ironclad.”

“This alarming challenge to national sovereignty must be met by a unified global commitment to peace and security,” Pelosi said of Russian aggression, while also calling for action to defend against China through continued “cooperation with our Asia-Pacific partners to bolster cybersecurity, counter disinformation, and preserve our collective defense.”

This week, NATO nations agreed on a new Strategic Concept that declares the Alliance’s priorities in staving off military and economic threats from Russia and China, reasserting shared democratic values and human-rights protections, and battling new threats from the realms of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence.

### 1NC---Israel

#### No Mid East escalation

Imran 19 [Myra Imran, writer for The News International. Citing the international seminar on “Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East”. Seminar on ‘Strategic dimensions of peace and conflict in South Asia, Middle East’. 2/6/19, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/428298-seminar-on-strategic-dimensions-of-peace-and-conflict-in-south-asia-middle-east]

Islamabad : There is a need to study the causes of proxy wars, and what are the potential impacts of such wars on the overall conflict. These thoughts in a daylong international seminar on ‘Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East,’ organised by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), an Islamabad-based think tank, participated by prominent national and international scholars.

Prof. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Deakin University, Australia, argued there is significant gap in the literature on non-state actors. He called for empirical research, along with concrete policy suggestions, on the topic, so as to mitigate the conflicts in the region, in particular South Asia and Middle East.

Speakers grappled at the notion of non-state actors and proxy wars: PIPS director Muhammad Amir Rana said non-state actors often evoke memories of violent elements. This despite that as per definition, non-state actors include organizations working for human rights.

Prof. Syed Rifaat Hussain, Department of Government and Public Policy, NUST, said the term “proxy wars” is a contested notion. There is no universal agreement on its definition, nor on the set of circumstances behind such wars. Interestingly, he said, proxy wars are as old as the phenomena of conventional war itself.

Speakers noted proxy wars are instruments of state power. As to why states go for it, it was argued, it is because they are often cheap undertaking to change the status quo.

Participants noted over the decades, much of the conflict involves non-state actors. Interstate conflict, on the other hand, has declined. In recent times, he said tit-for-tat tactics on behalf of such actors have reduced their appeal.

Dr. Ibrahim Fraihat, Doha Institute of Graduate Studies, Doha, termed proxy war as an arms conflict between two parties, though one of them is not directly involved. This way, domestic conflicts are escalated by external power intervention. At the same time, proxy war, if unresolved, can take the shape of conventional war, the most significant example was of Vietnam War. In contemporary times, he lamented, the Middle East has been rendered a stock market of proxy organizations.

William Gueriache, Associate Professor American University in the Emirates Dubai, said on surface, all states support open diplomacy and multilateralism. Yet the survival of patronage has paved the way for foreign intervention during conflicts in the whole Middle East. Dr. Marwan Kablan, Director Policy Analysis at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Doha, also hinted multiplicity of actors involved in Syrian conflict, calling it as mother of conflicts in the region. It was said that wars cannot be ended unless patron states achieve their interests. Dr. Shaheen Akhtar, Professor National Defence University Islamabad focused on the apprehension of Pakistan about India’s involvement in Afghanistan. She said Pakistan’s uneasy relationship with Kabul reinforces a perception of encirclement while growing US-India strategic cooperation further aggravates these apprehensions.

Dr. Muhammad Riaz Shad, National University of Modern Languages (NUML) Islamabad, said fighting through proxies gives states an opportunity of deniability.

#### No war—Iran and Israel are both risk averse, which limits likelihood of escalation

Miller, 15 – vice president for new initiatives and a distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Aaron David, 7/24. “Why War Isn’t Inevitable If Congress Rejects the Iran Nuclear Deal.” http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/07/24/why-war-isnt-inevitable-if-congress-rejects-iran-nuclear-deal/

Why go to war? The theory that conflict with Iran is inevitable rests on several highly arguable contentions. First is the assumption that Iran is willing to accelerate its nuclear program and to either break out or sneak out to a weapon and thus court a military response from Israel or the United States. The second big assumption is that Israel is just itching for an opportunity to unilaterally strike Iran with or without Washington’s approval. In the wake of a no vote by Congress, neither of these developments are certainties. Israel is implacably opposed to the deal, but Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is pretty risk-averse; he would have to think long and hard about launching strike in which Israel is operating at the margins of its capacity, particularly without a reason that would justify the severe international consequences.

And why would Iran want to provide such a reason as long as it could play the Security Council card and pocket the political and economic benefits that would flow from being cooperative? For Tehran, the smarter option in the wake of Congress blocking the accord would be to exploit the appetite for international investment and pick up as many chits as possible on the global stage by blaming the failure and missed opportunity on Washington. This isn’t a perfect outcome, but it’s a more compelling choice for Iran’s leadership than a headlong plunge into war. That course stands to bring Iran few benefits and many risks. Tehran is also aware that its ally Hezbollah is bogged down in Syria as part of Iran’s campaign to support Bashar al-Assad, which limits Tehran’s regional assets to use against Israel in the event of a military strike. If Congress blocks the nuclear agreement, the mullahs will take their time and consider all of Iran’s options. Courting a major strike from Israel and the U.S. isn’t necessarily one of them.

### 2NC---FI---Say No

#### They need all the countries to say yes.

Magnuson 6-15 [Stew Magnuson, 6-15-2022, "", No Publication, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/15/ukraine-to-us-defense-industry-we-need-long-range-precision-weapons, DOA: 7-1-2022 //ArchanSen]

Why do you think it is taking so long to deliver the weapon systems?

Sharapov: You should understand that any weapon transfer is always a political decision. And very often, it's not up to the government of one country. There are different alliances.

Very often a highly technological, highly precise weapons will contain subsystems from multiple countries. And if they were to transfer that technology, they will need to have permissions from all those countries.

And the other component is that, unfortunately, not all politicians understand the gravity of what is going on in Ukraine. Some people believe that this is not their war. This war is so far away it doesn’t concern them. But in reality, this is a war for the entire world. Unfortunately, we happen to be on the frontline of this.

## DoS CP

### 2NC---INB Solves Ukraine

#### Diplomacy solves Ukraine war.

Solomon 7-3 [Norman Solomon, 7-3-2022, "Nuclear War Could Mean Human Extinction. Biden and Congress Should Stop Messing Around.", Truthout, https://truthout.org/articles/nuclear-war-could-mean-annihilation-but-biden-and-congress-are-messing-around/, DOA: 7-3-2022 //ArchanSen]

As scholar Alfred McCoy just wrote, “With the specter of mass starvation looming for some 270 million people and, as the [United Nations] recently warned, political instability growing in those volatile regions, the West will, sooner or later, have to reach some understanding with Russia.” Only diplomacy can halt the carnage in Ukraine and save the lives of millions now at risk of starvation. And the dangers of nuclear war can be reduced by rejecting the fantasy of a military solution to the Ukraine conflict.